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MEDICAL CODE BLUE OR BLUE LIGHT SPECIAL:
WHERE IS THE MARKET FOR INDIGENT CARE?
PETER J. HAMMER*
The Journal of Law in Society at Wayne State University Law
School is addressing important questions in its Symposium: "Detroit
Health Care: Code Blue, or New Life?" Miners used to take canaries
into the mine to provide advance warning of toxic conditions.
Although the problems facing Detroit citizens and the Detroit health
care community are severe, they are symptomatic of problems facing
uninsured populations and urban hospitals throughout the nation.
What happens in Detroit, both in terms of problems as well as
solutions, will foreshadow developments nationally.
Underlying Detroit's health care problems are two distinct, but
interrelated, sets of concerns. The first deals with the medical needs of
the poor, uninsured and indigent people in Southeast Michigan. The
second deals with the financial sustainability of traditional urban
teaching hospitals, like the Detroit Medical Center (DMC).
Ultimately, the medical needs of the indigent and the working poor are
social problems invoking public obligations and public
responsibilities. In contrast, despite their non-profit status, the
financial stability of urban community hospitals implicates the need
for rational business strategies in a changing health care economy. As
one may anticipate, these objectives are in substantial tension with
each other. There is very little private incentive to provide expensive
medical care to people who don't have money. Just as the Beatles
cautioned on A Hard Day's Night that "Money Can't Buy Me Love,"'
markets can't be relied upon to buy you access. Indeed, it is just the
opposite. The decisions of policy makers and politicians to introduce
greater competition in health care over the past two decades have,
quite predictably, made the problem of access to health care worse, not
better.
Part I of this essay looks at the problems of the uninsured both
nationally and in Detroit. Traditionally, the medical needs of the poor
1. JOHN LENNON AND PAUL MCCARTNEY, Money Can't Buy Me Love, on A HARD
DAY'S NIGHT (BBC, 1964).
were met through various cross-subsidies. Part II examines how
economic and political developments have lead to the demise of these
cross-subsidies. Once cross-subsidies are removed, there are two
logical options. First, policy makers could provide direct subsidies-
make direct payments for the care that used to be paid for indirectly.
This requires explicit political judgments about the amount and type of
health care that the poor and uninsured are entitled to and presents a
difficult test of the political will of the community. Alternatively,
policy makers could free up markets to do what markets are good at,
innovating to meet unmet consumer demand. Here, the unmet demand
is for lower cost, and, what must openly be admitted, lower quality
health care. These options are explored in Part III. Part IV concludes
by returning to the problems of Detroit and thinking about future
options.
I. THE ANATOMY OF A CRISIS: DETROIT CODE BLUE
One barometer of how well political and economic markets for
health care are functioning is the number of uninsured individuals. In
1987, there were some 29.5 million uninsured individuals.2 In 1995,
the number increased to 37.3 million. 3 By 2003, the number was 44.7
million, constituting some 17.7 percent of the population.4 Some of
this increase is due to population growth. Other aspects of the
increase indicate growing problems, in absolute and relative terms, of
the ability of people to gain access to the health care system.
Like many social issues, the problems of the uninsured are
intertwined with problems of race and class. The fact that most of the
uninsured are poor (near or below the poverty line) is not surprising.
Readers who are not familiar with the problem, however, are often
surprised to learn that most of the uninsured are employed, making
uninsurance a problem largely of the working poor. These people do
2. Institute of Medicine, Uninsurance Facts and Figures: Overview available at
http://www.iom.edu/ file.asp?id=17736.
3. Id.
4. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, THE UNINSURED: A PRIMER, KEY FACTS
ABOUT AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE 20 (Table 1) (Nov. 2004).
not qualify for Medicaid and other safety net programs, but do not
work at the type of jobs where their employer offers health benefits as
part of the employment package. Race also plays a significant role.
Barriers to health care access are borne disproportionately by members
of minority populations. In 2003, 34.3% of Hispanic Americans, 28%





The problems facing Detroit are even more dramatic. For
instance, 21 % of all Detroiters are uninsured. This number is
significantly higher than the national average and is a rate that is twice
as high as that in the surrounding area.' Also, 47% of all children in
the city are living in poverty.2 Meanwhile, despite the obvious needs,
economic forces are driving providers out of, not into, the city. Some
20 hospitals have closed in the Detroit area since 1980. 3 51% of the
population lives in medically underserved areas (MUAs) as defined by
federal standards.4 A similar number live in federally designated
Health Care Provider Shortage Areas (HCPSAs).5 Detroit and its
suburbs remain heavily segregated in terms of racial, social and
economic differences. Some 42% of Detroiters who do have private
health insurance typically leave the city for the suburbs to get medical
care.6 Despite the outstanding reputation of many of the specialties at
the DMC and other urban providers like the Henry Ford Health
System, a disproportionately small percentage of suburban dwellers
venture into the city for medical care.
A lesson that cannot be repeated often enough is that the lack
of access to timely health care services is deadly. Internationally,
infant mortality rates are commonly used to contrast the performance
of different health care systems. The infant mortality rate in Detroit is
nearly twice as high as the state average - 14 infants in Detroit die in
the first year of life per 1000 births, in contrast to 7.9 per 1000 births
statewide. 7 Just as uninsurance rates track racial lines, so do adverse
6. GREATER DETROIT AREA HEALTH COUNCIL, HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE IN
SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN: CHART BOOK 61 (2003).
7. Kimberly Hayes Taylor, Doctor on Mission for Poor: DMC Crisis Rattles
Physician Commitment to Urban Care, THE DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 9, 2004, at I B.
8. Id.
9. Greater Detroit Area Health Council, supra note 6 at 44.
l0. Id. at45.
11. Taylor, supra note 7, at 1 B.
12. Greater Detroit Area Health Council, supra note 6 at 26.
health outcomes. Health inequalities are pronounced in Michigan.
"The infant mortality rate for Michigan African-Americans in 2000
was more than three times that for whites (18.2 vs. 6 per 1000 live
births)." 8 Racial inequalities do not end at birth. They carry forward
throughout life and death. "The death rate for Michigan African-
Americans in 1999 was 35 percent higher than that for Whites." 9 The
same disparities affect older Detroit residents regardless of race.
"Detroit area residents age 50-59 in region 1-A are dying at a rate
122% higher than the rest of the state. In the 50-59 age group there
were 1,306 deaths per 100,000 persons compared to 587 in the rest of
the state." 10
Recent experiences of the DMC illustrate the severe financial
stress experienced by many urban medical centers. As reported in the
Detroit News, financial losses of the DMC in 2003 amounted to $113
million.' 1 One important source of these losses was the amount of
uncompensated care the institution provided medically indigent
patients. The DMC provides a disproportionate amount of medical
care for the poor and uninsured residents of the city. In 2003, such
services cost the medical center $109 million. 12 While a significant
factor, the DMC's financial problems cannot all be laid on the
doorstep of providing indigent care. All hospitals face a difficult and
constantly changing business environment. Some have fared better
than others in managing these challenges. The DMC's record over the
13.Id. at28.
14. Id at 27.
15. Dying before their Time: The startling Truth about Mortality and Detroit Area
Seniors; A Synopsis of Three Research Report (Detroit Area on Aging, Detroit,
Mich. 2003) at 3.
16. Sheri Hall, DMC Expects Profit in 2005: Center Slashes $60 Million from
Budget, Lays Off 40 Managers and Reduces Vendor Payments, The Detroit News,
Feb. 27, 2004, at lB.
17. Sheri Hall and Paul Egan, Delays Jeopardize DMC Sites: Problems in Creating
Health Authority Could Close Hospitals, Leave Detroiters Without Care, The Detroit
News, Nov. 7, 2003, at lB.
last five years reveals a number of questionable business decisions, all
of which have contributed to its financial problems.'
3
In the spring of 2003, the DMC announced the possible closing
of two of its facilities, Detroit Receiving Hospital and Hutzel
Women's Hospital. 14 This triggered a strong community reaction and
a coordinated public response to the crisis. There was an immediate
$50 million cash infusion to the DMC, coming from the city, the
county, and the state. 15 There were further proposals to put together a
Detroit-Wayne County Health Authority to address both the needs of
the medically underserved in the community, as well as the financial
difficulties faced by the DMC and other Detroit hospitals in providing
uncompensated care. 16
II. THE RISE OF COMPETITION AND THE DEMISE OF CROSS-
SUBSIDIES
18. See, e.g., Joseph Godert, Outsourcing: Before and After the Contract is Signed,
Organizations that have outsourced I.T operations discuss the lesson they have
learned. Lesson No. I - after the ink dries on the contract, there's still plenty of
work to be done. Sidebar: When it all goes bad ... , 12 HEALTH DATA
MANAGEMENT 30 (March 2004) (describing DMC's financial difficulties in
outsourcing information technology services); David Barkholtz, OmniCare Adds
DMC Medicaid Plan, CRAIN'S DETROIT BUSINESS NEWS, Jan. 10, 2000, at 4
(detailing OmniCare's purchase of the DMC's failing Medicaid managed care
program); Mark Taylor, DMC Buys Back HMO: No Cash Trade with OmniCare to
Keep Hospital Atop "Healthcare Food Chain," MODERN HEALTHCARE, April 9,
2001, at 4 (describing the DMC's reacquisition of its failing Medicaid managed care
plan).
19. Sheri Hall, DMC to Slash Services: One of Center's Hospitals Could Even Close
if Turnaround Plan to Cut Costs Doesn't Work, THE DETROIT NEWS, March 4, 2003
at IA; Sheri Hall and Mike Martindale, DMC Cuts Staff, Hospitals: Struggling
Medical Center will Lay Off 1,000, Partially Close Detroit Receiving, Hutzel, THE
DETROIT NEWS, May, 21, 2003,at IA.
20. Sheri Hall, Taxpayers to Bail Out DMC: Granholm, Ficano, Kilpatrick Attach
Strings to Money; Hospital Must Restructure Board, THE DETROIT NEWS, June 17,
2003, at IA.
21. Sheri Hall, Changes to Proposed Health Authority Aid Uninsured, THE DETROIT
NEWS, March 19, 2004,at lB.
Traditionally, cross-subsidies played an important role in
providing medical access for indigent patients. With a cross-subsidy,
profits from treating one group of patients are used to offset losses
from treating another group of patients. Alternatively, the profits from
one line of business in a hospital can be used to offset losses incurred
by another department. This last example represents a form of "cost
shifting" that was once common in community hospitals. Cost
shifting, however is becoming less common as each hospital "revenue
center" is expected to carry its own weight.
In the days before private insurance, Medicare or Medicaid,
doctors would often engage in price discrimination. 17  If doctors
treated patients from diverse social classes, they would charge higher
prices to wealthier patients and lower prices to poorer patients. This
type of price discrimination can be an effective means of expanding
low-end market access. Price discrimination was not the only form of
cross subsidy in health care. The community rating of traditional Blue
Cross and Blue Shied plans was also a form of cross-subsidy,
redistributing wealth from relatively healthier patients in the pool to
relatively sicker patients. Community rating provided high-risk
patients greater access at a lower cost. Finally, with the advent of
public health insurance, certain cross-subsidies were built directly into
Medicare and Medicaid. While ostensibly Medicare is designed to
pay for the medical services of elderly beneficiaries, it has also been
used as a vehicle to support teaching hospitals and those hospitals that
provide a disproportionate share of medical services to the
uninsured. 18
Competition and cross-subsidies are like oil and water. They
cannot easily be mixed. Just as night follows day, greater competition
22. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53
AM. EcON. REV. 941, 957 (1963). For a discussion of changes in physician
practices in providing charity care since Arrow's writing, see Richard Kronick,
Valuing Charity, 26.5 JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW 993 (2001).
23. CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, ACUTE INPATIENT PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT SYSTEM: BACKGROUND (discussing "add-on" adjustments for
disproportionate share hospitals and expenses for indirect medical education),
available at http://www.cms. hhs.gov/providers/hipps/background.asp (last modified
Sept. 16, 2004).
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in health care markets inevitably leads to the erosion of cross-
subsidies. The story unfolds on the private and public side of the
market. On the private side, the growth of managed care has
introduced greater competition in the market for insurance, as well as
the market for medical services. Under ideal conditions, competition
drives prices to marginal costs. Economic profits indicate an area
where more resources should be directed for future growth. Losses, in
contrast, represent an area justifying the investment of fewer private
resources and a potential candidate for complete elimination (not a
candidate for a cross-subsidy). To the extent that revenues from
"profitable" services (or patients) were historically relied upon to
offset losses from unprofitable services (or patients), that discretion
disappears in a competitive environment. Moreover, effective
competition transforms the producer surplus (profits) held by medical
providers, into "consumer surplus" enjoyed by paying patients. Those
without sufficient resources to enter the market are excluded from the
process entirely.
Reflecting upon the tools and tactics of managed care provides
intuition about the mechanics of this process. "Selective contracting"
is employed to bargain with individual health care providers over
price, with credible threats to exclude high priced sellers from the
network. Particularly in markets with substantial excess capacity,
providers are motivated to make substantial price concessions to
maintain a flow of private patients. These negotiations drive prices
down to more closely reflect costs, and "surplus" is shifted to from the
sellers to the buyers (or at least the buyers' agent - the managed care
company or the employer). In theory, this leads to greater economic
efficiency and a better allocation of social resources. But it is also an
outcome that logically precludes the possibility of continued cross-
subsidies as a means of providing care to those who cannot
independently access the system as paying patients.
Intuition can also be gained by reflecting on the fate of
traditional Blue Cross and Blue Shield insurance plans. Just as
competition and selective contracting drives out cross-subsidies on the
provider side, competition between managed care companies drives
out cross-subsidies on the insurance side. A viable system of broad-
based community rating requires the existence of some degree of
monopoly power on the part of the insurer. 9 Again, competition and
cross-subsidies do not mix. Initially, Blue Cross and Blue Shield
plans were in near monopoly positions. As health insurance markets
became more competitive, it inevitably led to the erosion of cross-
subsidies in the form of community rating. In a competitive insurance
market, risk pools are progressively segmented so that only relatively
like risks are pooled and shared.20 Today, broad-based community
rating is a thing of the past. Indeed, many Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans have themselves become for-profit entities, and even the
remaining non-profit plans price and act largely like their competitive
rivals.
Significant changes are also taking place on the public side of
the market. Fiscal pressures create strong incentives to reduce
Medicare and Medicaid payments. Subsidies for graduate medical
education, which are an important source of revenue for urban
teaching hospitals, are primary candidates for reduction. The Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPac), the policy commission
overseeing Medicare, has proposed changes in the funding
methodology for medical education. MedPac proposes to shift
funding for graduate medical education from the Medicare program,
where it is an entitlement, into the category of general federal
revenue. 2 1 The logic behind the proposal mirrors developments on the
private side of the market - Medicare should get out of the business of
cross-subsidies. According to MedPac's theory, funding for each
component of public spending, like graduate medical education, needs
to be looked at and supported on its own merits as a candidate for
direct subsidy. They should no longer be the recipient of cross-
subsidies under the guise of Medicare.
While cross-subsidies are being eliminated on the demand-side
of the market, the range of supply-side substitutes competing against
traditional hospitals has grown dramatically. Technology now permits
24. See Arrow, supra note 22 at 963-64.
25. Id.
26. Richard A. Cooper & Linda H. Aiken, Human Inputs: The Health Care
Workforce and Medical Markets, in UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND THE
CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE at 71, 77-78 (P. Hammer, et al. eds. 2003).
many services to be performed on an out-patient basis that once
required hospitalization. This significantly alters the economics of
health care. The economies of scope that once justified centralizing a
wide range of services in a single community hospital are not as strong
as they once were. Similarly, the costs of market entry are lower and
many services now can be provided on a stand-alone basis. In one
sense, this is good. Greater service-line competition increases the
pressure to price at marginal costs. New entrants will rationally be
responding to profit opportunities. This further assists markets in
allocating resources towards profitable service-lines and away from
unprofitable service-lines, illustrating how the competitive system
operates. Competition is a systematic, methodical and sometimes
relentless process of continuously fracturing and segmenting products
and services and reassembling them into their most viable (profitable)
combinations. This same process systematically redirects social
resources towards economically productive (profitable) ends and away
from socially unproductive (unprofitable) endeavors.
Under appropriate circumstances, competition enhances
efficiency, but there are some important caveats to this economic
story. The efficiency of the competitive system is premised on the
assumption that prices act as accurate signals, representing the real
social value of the underlying resource or service in question. Value
in this context is a measure of the opportunity cost of the resource in
its next-best social use. Computer experts are fond of the adage
"garbage in, garbage out." The same applies here. If the prices that
the economic market is responding to are wrong (garbage in), then the
allocation of resources determined by the market will be inefficient
(garbage out). In health care, the "prices" that the market is
responding to are more often than not dictated by political and
administrative processes (Medicare and Medicaid policy). Ironically
then, the economic assertion that competition in health care is
''efficient" necessarily presupposes the belief that these publicly
determined "prices" reflect real social costs, a contestable, if not
highly questionable assumption.
The current debate over specialty hospitals is illustrative.
Recently, there has been a substantial increase in the number of
ambulatory surgery centers, typically owned by large physician
practice groups, and specialty hospitals, which provide only one type
of care, such as orthopedic or cardiac services. These new entities
compete against traditional community hospitals, but they can target
and segment patient populations by particular ailments and potentially
by payor status. If these new providers are successful because they
have lower costs (exploit new developments in technology) or better
respond to unmet consumer demand, then one would view their rise as
efficiency enhancing. If, however, the rise of specialty hospitals is in
response to loopholes in self-referral laws, efforts to avoid EMTALA
obligations or are forms of regulatory price arbitrage exploiting
shortcomings in administratively determined prices 22 (garbage in),
then one would question the efficiency of specialty hospitals (garbage
out).
Regardless of their efficiency attributes, the rise of specialty
hospitals is consistent with the broader story of how competition
inevitable leads to the erosion of cross-subsidies. The growth of these
facilities threatens the viability of the business model underlying the
traditional community hospital. Furthermore, they symbolically
represent the progressive fracturing and segmentation of medical
services and payor classes characteristic of dynamic competitive
processes. In a world where each medical service is discretely
provided and sold to paying patients at its marginal cost, there is no
room for cross-subsidies. Ironically, then, competition in health care
has effectively raised the market barriers facing the uninsured even
higher. Increasingly, the uninsured are on the outside of the market,
looking in.
III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?: DIRECT SUBSIDIES OR WALMART
MEDICINE?
A lesson I stress with my students is that government decisions
regarding health care can be thought of as classic "make or buy"
decisions. General Motors must decide whether to produce certain
parts internally (make), or contract with other companies for their
production (buy). Similarly, some countries, like the United
Kingdom, provide public health benefits largely through public
27. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Antitrust Law,
22 HEALTH AFFAIRS 88, 93-94 (Nov./Dec. 2003) (discussing the economic and
regulatory issues raised by specialty hospitals).
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facilities like the National Health Service (make). Other countries,
like the United States, provide public benefits largely through private
facilities (buy). One solution to the problem of the uninsured would
be government funded universal coverage provided through public
facilities. For complicated social and political reasons, the United
States has consistently rejected this option. The following discussion,
therefore, assumes that universal coverage is not politically feasible.
Rather, it will examine what can be done within a context where the
United States continues its market-based experiment for meeting
health care needs.
There is great irony in the assertion that the American health
care system is "private." The truth is that it is an often dysfunctional
public-private hybrid. The analysis of Part II is straightforward: The
rise of competition has led to the demise of cross-subsidies. In the
absence of cross-subsidies, there are two basic alternatives for
providing care to poor and indigent patients. The first is to provide
direct subsidies. If society values the ability of the poor and indigent
to access the health care system, then it should go to the market, pony-
up the cash and buy the desired services. The viability of this option is
largely a political question. Alternatively, if the political will does not
exist to provide direct subsidies, policy makers could remove existing
constraints on the market's ability to solve the problem itself. This
alternative takes the market-based approach to its logical conclusion.
Unconstrained markets will typically provide differentiated products
in response to differential consumer demand. The existence of 45
million uninsured individuals indicates a serious unmet demand for
lower cost and lower quality care. The second alternative, therefore, is
to permit the markets to provide low-end, WalMart-style medicine.
23
Each of these options will be considered in turn.
In America it is a truism that "you get what you pay for."
Conversely, if you do not pay for it, you do not get it. In the absence
of the willingness to engage in structural reform, the problem of
medical access for the poor and uninsured must be met through the
provision of greater public resources: direct subsidies for care.
Marshaling public resources requires successful political action,
raising the question as to whether the political will exists to support
23 While not guilty of mixing metaphors, by conflating K-Mart's "blue light special"
with Walkart-styled medicine, I am guilty of mixing big-box, low-end retailers.
such an effort. If history is any guide, the answer is no. The
continued plight of the millions of uninsured stands in quiet
condemnation of the lack of political willingness to address the
problem. The reasons for this inaction are easy to discern. One need
only recall the socioeconomic breakdown of the uninsured. The
uninsured consist mostly of poor white people, along with
disproportionately represented numbers of poor Hispanics, Blacks and
Native Americans. These are not constituents with substantial
economic resources to influence government. Moreover, in contrast to
the politically active beneficiaries of the Medicare program, the ranks
of the uninsured are not filled with individuals who are traditionally
active in the political process. None of the dynamics necessary for a
successful political movement are present.
This suggests an underappreciated truth. The existence of
cross-subsidies in the first instance is likely to be correlated with types
of assistance that most people would agree is something society should
provide, in conjunction with the absence of the political dynamics
necessary to make direct subsidies feasible. Traditional cross-
subsidies for indigent care may well have come into being exactly
because of the lack of political ability to marshal resources directly. If
this is the case, then the typical economist's prescription to simply
replace cross-subsidies with direct subsidies sounds hollow and
politically naive. Political markets can fail just as easily as economic
markets.
In the absence of the political will to provide direct subsidies
for the uninsured, can the market heal itself? Fundamentally, the
uninsured need basic, low cost medical care. Markets are usually
good at responding to unmet consumer demand. Can markets
independently provide low cost (and presumptively lower quality)
care? 24 As I frequently ask my students, "why don't we see WalMart
28. What lower quality means in this setting needs to be spelled out. Lower quality
means relatively greater reliance on certified nurse practitioners and physician
assistants, rather than physicians themselves. It means a focus on primary and
preventative care. It means restrictions on the ability of individuals to choose their
own providers. It also means strong restrictions on high-end, tertiary services
(limitations on the scope of coverage). Lower quality as used in this article does not
mean a willingness to subject persons to unsafe practices or a willingness to sanction
malpractice. It simply means that people would be permitted to knowingly purchase
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medicine?" Framed as such, one can begin to identify a number of
legal (and political) barriers to WalMart-styled medicine.
To begin with, state licensing laws and scope of practice
limitations implicitly define and limit the type of medical "products"
that can be sold. In the name of ensuring minimum levels of quality
(and protecting provider incomes) licensing laws operate to chop off
the low-end tail of the market. One of the invisible costs of licensing,
therefore, is to deny consumers a range of choices that might
otherwise exist. Another invisible cost is how licensing laws prohibit
what might otherwise be quite rational substitutions of supply-side
labor inputs. The legal barriers to WalMart medicine, however, go far
beyond licensing laws. As argued for many years by Clark
Havighurst, complicated interactions between tort and contract law
seriously constrain the ability of health care to be privately rationed by
conscious ex ante consumer choices. 25  Tort law often imposes
categorically determined, national standards of care. Courts are
reluctant to honor contracts that might limit the potential tort liability
of medical providers. Finally, biases deeply embedded in insurance
law make it very difficult to draft and enforce the type of contracts that
would be necessary for developing the business infrastructure
underlying WalMart medicine.
Obviously, the laws and public policies preventing WalMart
medicine could be changed. Here, one confronts an almost visceral
opposition to the very idea of letting people choose lower cost, lower
quality health care. The myth that all people should receive the same
quality of care is very powerful. Unfortunately, this instinct is not
politically powerful enough to build a coalition for universal coverage,
or to support direct subsidies to provide higher quality care to the poor
and uninsured. Cognitive dissonance, however, is nothing new in
politics. We collectively think that the uninsured are entitled to the
best quality of care that money can provide. We are just collectively
unwilling to pay for it. The price of this hypocrisy is the maintenance
a package of services that provided substantially less coverage at substantially lower
costs than the standard insurance package.
29. Clark C. Havighurst, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM (1994).
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of a myth of equality in the face of a demonstrably unequal system of
health care access.
Is the visceral reaction that most people feel to WalMart
medicine justified? Most markets, even those for things that are
necessary for life itself are segmented and differentiated. Wealthier
people live in nicer houses and eat better food than those with less
income. Some intuition can be gained from thinking about the market
for automobiles. In the market for cars, there is a full menu of choices
reflecting the heterogeneous nature of consumer demand. Some of
these differences are driven purely by different preferences for style or
color. Other preferences are driven by concerns for safety or
economy. Other differences are driven primarily by differences in
income. Some people buy a Hyundai because it is all they can afford.
Others buy a Lexus, because they can. There is no doubt that smaller,
compact cars are less safe and have higher relative rates of injuries and
fatalities than safer, more expensive models. Nevertheless, people
with lower incomes are permitted to purchase less safe cars.
Moreover, competition is a powerful force that progressively fractures
and segments automobile markets in response to differences in
consumer demand, and provides low income consumers products that
match their preferences and ability to pay. Similar competitive forces
have been unleashed in medical markets in the past twenty years, but
they have not been unleashed to their full potential, and have not been
permitted to fill in gaps at the low-end of the market.
Most questions about fairness and equity can be reduced to
debates over what is the relevant baseline. This is why it is useful to
juxtapose the question of direct subsidies with the question of
WalMart medicine. If the relevant baseline is high, uniform quality
for all, WalMart medicine appears unjust. It forces poorer persons to
have lower quality care (even if it is at a lower price). This baseline,
however, is only realistic if there is the political will to directly
subsidize care for all. If the relevant baseline is the current political
reality, where 45 million people are denied any meaningful access to
care, then WalMart medicine does not look that unfair after all.
Lower cost and lower quality care compared to a baseline of no
meaningful access to services is at least a step in the right direction.
IV. CONCLUSION
So, what is to be done? Ross Perot used to be fond of saying
that there were plans laying everywhere around Washington D.C. All
we have to do is bend down, pick one up, and implement it.
Unfortunately, the bad news is that there really aren't many clear
answers for how to address Detroit's health care needs. This is not
just a problem for Detroit. It is a national problem. Health care
markets have experienced tumultuous changes in the past two decades.
Large urban hospitals like the DMC face complicated and nearly
insurmountable challenges, with few successful models to build upon.
New leadership at the DMC appears to have at least stopped the
financial hemorrhaging and have started to put the financial house in
better order. Sadly, the direction of sound financial management of
the hospital will likely lead the institution further away from
addressing the needs of the poor and uninsured. It is the nature of the
competitive market.
The needs of the uninsured must be addressed largely through
political processes. Steps have been taken in this direction through the
formation of the Detroit-Wayne County Public Health authority. But
the concept of a public authority simply raises other difficult
questions. Who is going to pay for the care? How will the care be
managed? Will the public authority own their own facilities (make) or
simply be a financier of care (buy)? There are no simple answers to
these questions and, again, few successful domestic models to build
upon. Historically, the State of Michigan has had an embarrassingly
poor record in experimenting with Medicaid managed care to provide
health services for vulnerable populations.26 This should make City
and County officials somewhat nervous about rushing in to participate
in the market for indigent care. We are left with far more questions
than answers. All we know for certain is that there is a blue light on
the horizon.
30. See Carol S. Weissert & Malcorn L. Goggin, Nonincremental Policy Change:
Lessons from Michigan's Medicaid Managed Care Initiative, 62 PUB. ADMIN. REv.
206, 207 (2002).
